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RESEARCH NOTES
Minority Group Interests and Political Representation:
Gay Elected Officials in the Policy Process*
Donald P. Haider-Markel, Mark R. Joslyn,
and Chad J. Kniss
University of Kansas
Of key importance to groups in a democracy is the political representation of their interests in the
policy process. The most obvious strategy of groups to achieve representation is to elect officials
that identify with group interests. Our research examines the political representation of lesbian and
gay interests, exploring the influence of openly gay elected officials on domestic partner policies.
Based on the literature, we select and operationalize variables that may influence policy adoption.
Analysis on a dataset of 270 localities suggests that elected gay officials are an important determi-
nant for achieving substantive political representation. Our findings also suggest that supportive
non-gay elected officials can effectively represent gays in the policy process.
Political representation is essential to any democratic system of government.
Through electoral institutions individuals and groups are able to select candi-
dates who represent their political preferences. Women, ethnic, and racial mi-
norities are especially conscious of electoral representation, each believing their
interests may be brought to the fore and kept there through public officials shar-
ing group identification (Mladenka 1989; Matland 1993; Thomas 1994). Al-
though shared identification and experience cannot guarantee representation,
research suggests the presence of elected black and Hispanic officials increases
the likelihood that black and Hispanic interests are represented in policy pro-
cesses (Eisinger 1982; Mladenka 1989; Saltzstein 1989).
Lesbians and gay men share similar concerns over political representation.
However, it has yet to be determined whether elected gay officials effectively
represent the interests of the gay community in the policy process. The ex-
ceedingly negative attitudes toward homosexuals as a group and the relatively
*A previous version of this paper was presented at the 1998 annual meeting of the Midwest Political
Science Association. The authors would like to thank David Lowery and three anonymous review-
ers for their suggestions.
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few gays in the general population suggest lesbian and gay concerns about
representation may be particularly acute (Sherrill 1996). As a stigmatized
numerical minority, therefore, gays and lesbians may try to achieve political
representation through election of openly gay candidates to public office, or
by influencing the behavior of elected sympathetic heterosexuals and closeted
homosexuals.
In this study, we seek to add to the existing literature on political represen-
tation in three ways. First, we consider a previously neglected group—gays and
lesbians—and attempt to ascertain whether the election of gay candidates pro-
duces substantive as opposed to symbolic representation (Eisinger 1982; Saltzstein
1989). In light of the fact that approximately 124 gays and lesbians held public
office in 1997, and 64% of these were at the local level (Ness 1999), this ques-
tion merits some attention. Second, as distinct from previous research that sim-
ply identified correlations between group presence and policies related to group
interests (see Eisinger 1982; Saltzstein 1989), our study addresses temporal cau-
sation by controlling for when elected gays take office and when the related pol-
icy is adopted. Finally, we examine the issue of domestic partner policies in
American localities to determine if policy is significantly influenced by the pres-
ence of gay or lesbian elected officials. Unlike some minority policies previ-
ously examined, domestic partner policies clearly—and nearly exclusively—
benefit gays and lesbians. As such, this study offers an explicit test of substantive
political representation of minorities.
Political Representation of Group Interests
The representation of citizen interests in most democratic systems occurs
through the election of officials who represent those interests. Government of-
ficials are elected, in large measure, based on party and group affiliation and
issue positions (Campbell et al. 1960). As such, constituents can expect repre-
sentation based on the extent to which their affiliations and positions coincide
with those of their elected officials (Kingdon 1989). When an official clearly
belongs to a particular ethnic, racial, or religious group, the group is said to
achieve symbolic or descriptive representation (see Fox 1997, Saltzstein 1989,
and Swain 1993 for a summary of the literature). The normative inference then
follows: Elected officials will spend part of their time representing the interests
of their community, thereby translating symbolic representation into substan-
tive representation. Although groups may of course achieve substantive repre-
sentation without symbolic by electing sympathetic elites (Browning, Marshall,
and Tabb 1984), symbolic representation is viewed as a more efficient and re-
liable means for achieving representation in the policy process (Gerber, Mor-
ton, and Rietz 1998).
Initial research on black political representation suggests that the election of
blacks results in policy benefits to the black community (Cole 1976). In the 1980s
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and 1990s, researchers continued to find significant links between the election
of minorities and women and policies adopted by local and state governments
(Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984; Eisinger 1982; Mladenka 1989; Saltzstein
1989; Thomas 1994). Although it appears that minority groups are able to em-
ploy symbolic representation to advance substantive policy goals, we should
not conclude that symbolic representation has no other value. Consequences
evidently flow from the mere presence of specific groups, affecting decision
processes among both elites and voters (Pitkin 1967; Browning, Marshall, and
Tabb 1984). In fact, Wahlke (1971, 288) asserted that “symbolic satisfaction with
the process of government is probably more important than specific, instrumen-
tal satisfaction with the policy output of the process.”
Thus, it appears policy-making profits from the symbolism of minority group
inclusion, advancing the legitimacy of governmental outputs. Indeed, the pres-
ence of gay officials may challenge many of the arguments against gay-related
policies; gay officials can function to undermine negative conventions by effec-
tively articulating and personalizing the wishes of the gay community. In short,
gay officials can thus be prominent in city hall politics by sensitizing others to
the demands of lesbians and gays.1
Domestic Partner Policy and Politics
In the aforementioned literature, political representation links two compo-
nents: the election of group members and subsequent government action that
benefits the represented groups (Saltzstein 1989, 526). However, identifying group
interests is difficult. Here we chose a policy that is consistently demanded by
gay interests, generally exclusive to gays, and has both symbolic and tangible
benefits—domestic partner policies (Murphy 1993).
To solve some of the problems associated with the inability to marry, gay ad-
vocates have proposed policies for same-sex partners. One such policy is do-
mestic partner registration. Similar to a marriage license, same-sex couples can
register their relationship and receive a certificate (Badgett 1994; Murphy 1993).
A related policy assists the domestic partners of employees by supplying tangi-
ble benefits. In an increasing number of local governments, employees and their
1On gay officials and domestic partner policies, we can also find anecdotal evidence of sym-
bolic and substantive representation. In Santa Barbara, California, gay council member Tom Rob-
erts was the main force behind the enactment of a 1997 domestic partner benefits policy to city
employees (Price 1997). Christine Kehoe, San Diego’s first lesbian city council member, success-
fully sponsored legislation providing insurance to domestic partners of city employees in 1994. Sim-
ilarly, Santa Cruz mayor John Laird ensured the passage of a benefits policy as well as other gay-
friendly policies (Button, Rienzo, and Wald 1997). Gay and lesbian officials also spearheaded passage
of domestic partner policies in Ann Arbor, Chapel Hill, San Francisco, Seattle, and West Holly-
wood (Haider-Markel 1997a; 1998).
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domestic partners are granted the financial benefits of married partners, includ-
ing insurance benefits (Badgett 1994).2
Methods and Data
To examine the relationship between elected officials and the adoption of do-
mestic partner policies, we constructed a dataset of 270 American cities and coun-
ties for our empirical analysis. To do this, we first identified the 105 localities
that adopted domestic partner registries, domestic partner benefits, or both as
of June 1998 (see Haider-Markel 1998). Second, as a control group, we added
the 125 randomly selected localities used by Wald, Button, and Rienzo (1996).
Third, to increase the number of localities in our sample that have elected gay
officials, we also included the 126 non-randomly selected localities with anti-
discrimination laws for gays and lesbians used by Wald, Button, and Rienzo
(1996). Due to overlap between the samples, adding the final cases increases
our N by 40 cases (those localities with antidiscrimination policies but no do-
mestic partner policy), for a total of 270 localities.3
Dependent Variables
As of June 1998, 38 localities had adopted some form of domestic partner
registration policy, while 67 localities offered some benefits to non-married gov-
ernment employees in committed relationships.4 For example, Boston began of-
fering limited benefits in 1993, while Atlanta offers both registration and benefits.
The fact that significantly more localities have adopted benefits rather than reg-
istration suggests the political dynamics of the two policies may differ, with reg-
istries perhaps more controversial. As such, we examine registration and benefits
as distinct policies. For each domestic partner policy, each locality is assigned
a one if the policy was adopted and a zero if the policy was not adopted. This
formulation thus requires logistic regression.
Political Representation
We capture the possible effects of substantive representation with a variable
that is a simple count of the number of openly lesbian or gay council members
(57) and mayors (5) elected prior to the adoption of a domestic partner policy,
2 Although domestic partner benefit policies can cost local governments a significant amount of
money, these policies may actually be less controversial than registries. Registries may provoke sig-
nificant resistance as opponents fear that this government recognition of homosexual relationships
too closely resembles that of heterosexual marriage (i.e., the issuance of a certificate by the
government).
3 Dropping the 40 non-random cases does not significantly change our findings, but including
these cases provides a more conservative test because it ensures that most localities with elected
gay officials are included in our sample.
4 A complete list is available from the lead author at prex@lark.cc.ukans.edu.
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and were also in office when the policy was adopted.5 For example, Ann Arbor,
Michigan, had two gay officials elected before the adoption of its domestic part-
ner registry, and those same two officials were in office when the policy was
adopted. As such, Ann Arbor is coded as a two on political representation. New
Orleans, Louisiana, meanwhile, adopted a domestic partner registry in 1993, but
had no elected gay officials at the time. Thus, New Orleans is coded as zero on
political representation.
A key contribution here is that unlike previous studies of political represen-
tation, our measure of political representation accounts for temporal causality.
Past aggregate-level research has not attempted to determine if officials were
elected before policies were adopted or when either event occurred—researchers
simply tested for potential correlations between the presence of officials and
policies (Eisinger 1982; Mladenka 1989; Saltzstein 1989).6
Control Variables
Because domestic partner policies have become a significant issue in lesbian
and gay politics, the factors likely to influence these policies should be similar
to those that influence other gay-related policies. This section outlines the basic
logic and operationalization of other determinants of domestic partner policy
adoption.
Lesbians and gays, the main beneficiaries of domestic partner policies, are
more likely to obtain such policies if they can effectively mobilize (Haider-
Markel 1997b). In some American localities, gay groups have considerable strength
in the policy-making process (Button, Rienzo, and Wald 1997). We employ two
measures of potential gay interest group resources—the potential financial re-
sources of the gay community and a surrogate measure of potential gay interest
group members. We measure potential financial resources with a count of the
number of gay-owned bars, newspapers, and services per 100,000 persons in a
locality.7 Our measure of potential gay and lesbian interest group members is
the number of same-sex unmarried partner households per 1,000 local population.8
Similar to previous efforts (Haider-Markel and Meier 1996; Mooney and Lee
1995; Wald, Button, and Rienzo 1996), we capture the effect of conservative
religious forces by including a measure of the percentage of a locality’s popu-
5 Most of the data on gay elected officials can be found in (Haider-Markel 1997a), but are avail-
able from the authors on request. The data were collected in a thorough search of gay politics lit-
erature, gay newspapers (especially The Washington Blade), the Gay and Lesbian Victory Fund,
and the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force.
6 It is also important to recognize that our measure includes many forms of influence, whether it
is largely symbolic or purely substantive as aggressive sponsors of domestic partner legislation. In
either event, the presence of gays may or may not afford a substantive policy outcome.
7 For a description see Wald, Button, and Rienzo’s (1996) use of the Damron Road Atlas and
Haider-Markel and Meier’s (1996) similar measure.
8 Unless otherwise noted, all data are from the U.S. Bureau of the Census (various years). See
Haider-Markel (1997b) and Wald, Button, and Rienzo (1996) for a full description of this variable.
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lation that belong to conservative (Protestant or evangelical) denominations.9
Similarly, the Republican party’s focus on traditional family values has led many
to suggest Republican opposition to non-traditional gender roles and homosex-
uality (Layman and Carmines 1997). As such, the percent of a locality’s vote
for President Bush in 1992 is included as a measure of local partisanship and,
indirectly, support for traditional family values.
During policy formulation, the values of both political elites and the masses
are often crucial to adoption (Kingdon 1995). Elite support on gay issues is mea-
sured as the average percent a locality’s House representative voted for a pro-
gay position in the 103rd Congress.10 Finally, because studies find increased
levels of education and urbanism are positively associated with greater levels
of support for gay civil rights (Haeberle 1996; Donovan and Bowler 1996), we
include the percentage of the local population with a college degree and the pop-
ulation of the locality.
Results
The results from a logistic regression analysis of domestic partner registries
in 270 localities are shown in Table 1. The first column displays the results for
the model predicting the likelihood a locality will adopt domestic partner reg-
istration absent the political representation variable. The second column dis-
plays the coefficients of the fully specified model that includes the political
representation variable. Moreover, influence statistics appear in the third col-
umn in order to clarify the relative impact of the independent variables.
Overall, the model performs quite well, predicting approximately 88% of the
cases correctly. Moreover, the direction of estimated relationships generally con-
forms to expectations. For example, support for family values is negatively re-
lated to the adoption of registries, while education, elite sentiment, gay businesses,
and gay households are positively related to adoption of domestic partner reg-
istries. Conservative Protestants, population, and gay households do not, how-
ever, achieve statistical significance.
After incorporation of the political representation variable, the model’s fit sta-
tistics improve. More important, results indicate the presence of lesbian or gay
officials significantly increases the probability of domestic partner registration.
Inspection of influence statistics indicates that gay officials affect the adoption
of registration policies more so than any other factor. The evidence of substan-
tive representation thus appears strong and comparable with findings concern-
ing black and Hispanic political representation in local government.
9 See Wald, Button, and Rienzo (1996) for the denominations classified as religious conserva-
tive. The data are from Bradley et al. (1992) and are county-level.
10 For example, a representative who voted for the pro-gay position on three out of four votes
would receive a score of 75%. The measure is also weighted by a locality’s share of the population
for a House district. See Wald, Button, and Rienzo (1996) for data source and measurement.
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Estimates for the adoption of domestic partner benefits also appear in Table 1.
The fourth column displays the estimates for controls only, and the fifth column
includes the political representation variable. As expected, relationships differ
from the previous model, reflecting a somewhat different pattern of politics. Po-
litical elites, gay businesses and households, and mass tolerance—as indicated
by population size—have relatively more influence on the adoption of benefits
policies. Family values/partisanship, education, and religious conservatives have
relatively less influence, however. This finding ostensibly supports the notion that
benefits policies are less controversial. Religious forces and moral concerns ex-
ert less influence on benefits policy, while potential resources of gay interest groups
have more influence on benefits policies than on registration policies.
Most important, gay political representation significantly influences the adop-
tion of domestic partner benefits. However, unlike the registration model, it is
not the most influential factor. Instead, elite support has the greatest influence.
If benefits policies are actually less controversial than registration policies, this
might explain why the support of sympathetic elites has more influence on pol-
icy than do gay representatives. Heterosexual officials may find it less risky po-
litically to support benefits rather than registration.
Conclusions
This study examined the question of substantive political representation of
gay and lesbian interests in the policy process. We suggested that gay activists
are more likely to be successful in the policy-making process if they elect openly
gay officials. To test this hypothesis, we examined the role of gay elected offi-
cials in local adoption of domestic partner policies using a dataset of 270 Amer-
ican localities.
Overall, our empirical results suggest a number of key points. First, the pat-
terns of politics surrounding both types of domestic partner policies differ, but
the adoption of these policies is driven by many of the same forces that influ-
ence the adoption of gay civil rights policies (Haeberle 1996; Haider-Markel
and Meier 1996; Wald, Button, and Rienzo 1996). Second, the presence of
supportive factors, such as an educated populace, sympathetic elites, and gay
interest group resources, matters more than opposition forces, including sup-
port for traditional values and the presence of conservative religious denomi-
nations. Finally, while most of these factors significantly influence the adoption
of domestic partner policies, the single most important factor influencing reg-
istration policy is political representation of lesbians and gays. Elected gays
also exert a strong influence on the adoption of domestic partner benefit pol-
icies, but the influence of supportive elites is greater. We suggest this distinc-
tion arises because heterosexual officials may find it easier to support benefits
policies over registration policies.
This combination of results suggests that election of gay officials is not sim-
ply a symbolic action, as they evidently represent the interests of their commu-
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nity. In some policy arenas, this substantive political representation may make
the difference between policy adoption or failure, but in others, gay officials
are one political influence among many. Whether as a symbolic force or legis-
lative entrepreneur, elected gays are important for achieving the policy goals of
the gay community. However, our findings also suggest that gays should not ig-
nore alliances with heterosexual officials interested in gay concerns. This find-
ing is especially relevant to gays as a group since they have achieved a minimal
level of success in electing gay officials (Ness 1999).
More broadly, the results presented in this article underscore the importance
of individual legislators. Indeed, the structural designs, behavioral conventions,
and normative processes within governing institutions are evidently pliant, ac-
commodating the various personalities and perspectives that electoral democ-
racy provides. Further research would in fact do well to examine how gay, minority,
and female officials promote policy ideas, interact with policy experts, frame
ideas, and form political coalitions in local, state, and national legislatures.
Manuscript submitted 23 February, 1999
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